Hackers usam anti-virus online para testar o seu malware

Um artigo muito interessante da Wired ("A Google Site Meant to Protect You Is Helping Hackers Attack You") que explica como várias equipas de hackers têm vindo a usar o serviço VirusTotal para testar se o malware que desenvolvem é detectar por vários anti-virus.

Before companies like Microsoft and Apple release new software, the code is reviewed and tested to ensure it works as planned and to find any bugs.
Hackers and cybercrooks do the same. The last thing you want if you’re a cyberthug is for your banking Trojan to crash a victim’s system and be exposed. More importantly, you don’t want your victim’s antivirus engine to detect the malicious tool.
So how do you maintain your stealth? You submit your code to Google’s VirusTotal site and let it do the testing for you.
(...)
VirusTotal is a free online service—launched in 2004 by Hispasec Sistemas in Spain and acquired by Google in 2012—that aggregates more than three dozen antivirus scanners made by Symantec, Kaspersky Lab, F-Secure and others. Researchers, and anyone else who finds a suspicious file on their system, can upload the file to the site to see if any of the scanners tag it malicious. But the site, meant to protect us from hackers, also inadvertently provides hackers the opportunity to tweak and test their code until it bypasses the site’s suite of antivirus tools.

Um aspecto interessante é que até equipas sofisticadas como a APT1 e NetTraveler foram descobertas a usar o serviço:
One of the most prolific groups he tracked belongs to the infamous Comment Crew team, also known by security researchers as APT1, which was responsible for hacking The New York Times. Believed to be a state-sponsored group tied to China’s military, Comment Crew also reportedly is responsible for stealing terabytes of data from Coca-Cola, RSA and more than 100 other companies and government agencies since 2006. More recently, the group has focused on critical infrastructure in the U.S., targeting companies like Telvent, which makes control system software used in parts of the U.S. electrical power grid, oil and gas pipelines and in water systems. The group Dixon tracked isn’t the main Comment Crew outfit but a subgroup of it.
He also spotted and tracked a group known by security researchers as NetTraveler. Believed to be in China, NetTraveler has been hacking government, diplomatic and military victims for a decade, in addition to targeting the office of the Dalai Lama and supporters of Uyghur and Tibetan causes.

Outro ponto é que a utilização de trial&error básico para tentar evitar a detecção:

The data provides a rare and fascinating look at the inner workings of the hacker teams and the learning curve they followed as they perfected their attacks. During the three months he observed the Comment Crew gang, for example, they altered every line of code in their malware’s installation routine and added and deleted different functions. But in making some of the changes to the code, the hackers screwed up and disabled their Trojan at one point. They also introduced bugs and sabotaged other parts of their attack. All the while, Dixon watched as they experimented to get it right.
Between August and October 2012, when Dixon watched them, he mapped the Crew’s operations as they modified various strings in their malicious files, renamed the files, moved components around, and removed the URLs for the command-and-control servers used to communicate with their attack code on infected machines. They also tested out a couple of packer tools—used to reduce the size of malware and encase it in a wrapper to make it harder for virus scanners to see and identify malicious code.
Some of their tactics worked, others did not. When they did work, the attackers often were able to reduce to just two or three the number of engines detecting their code. It generally took just minor tweaks to make their attack code invisible to scanners, underscoring how hard it can be for antivirus engines to keep pace with an attacker’s shapeshifting code.
There was no definitive pattern to the kinds of changes that reduced the detection rate. Although all of the samples Dixon tracked got detected by one or more antivirus engine, those with low detection rates were often found only by the more obscure engines that are not in popular use.

Artigo completo na Wired