As maiores data breaches

The World's Biggest Data Breaches, In One Incredible Infographic - Business Insider


Email seguro - Dark Mail

O Phill Zimmermann, a Lavabit e outros acabam de publicar uma especificação e implementação de um protocolo para mail cifrado end-to-end:

Our Mission
To bring the world our unique end-to-end encrypted protocol and architecture that is the 'next-generation' of private and secure email. As founding partners of The Dark Mail Technical Alliance, both Silent Circle and Lavabit will work to bring other members into the alliance, assist them in implementing the new protocol and jointly work to proliferate the world's first end-to-end encrypted 'Email 3.0' throughout the world's email providers. Our goal is to open source the protocol and architecture and help others implement this new technology to address privacy concerns against surveillance and back door threats of any kind.

website

Mais dados sobre que criptografia foi quebrada pela NSA

Um artigo do Spiegel intitulado "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security" contém novidades sobre que mecanismos foram e não foram quebrados pela NSA. A informação sobre os que não foram quebrados é especialmente interessante. Como diz o artigo, "To a certain extent, the Snowden documents should provide some level of relief to people who thought nothing could stop the NSA in its unquenchable thirst to collect data. It appears secure channels still exist for communication." O artigo contém uma série de links interessantes para diversos documentos.

(…) the NSA cryptologists divided their targets into five levels corresponding to the degree of the difficulty of the attack and the outcome, ranging from "trivial" to "catastrophic."

Monitoring a document's path through the Internet is classified as "trivial." Recording Facebook chats is considered a "minor" task, while the level of difficulty involved in decrypting emails sent through Moscow-based Internet service provider "mail.ru" is considered "moderate." Still, all three of those classifications don't appear to pose any significant problems for the NSA.

Mecanismos aparentemente seguros:

Things first become troublesome at the fourth level. The presentation states that the NSA encounters "major" problems in its attempts to decrypt messages sent through heavily encrypted email service providers like Zoho or in monitoring users of the Tor network*, which was developed for surfing the web anonymously. Tor, otherwise known as The Onion Router, is free and open source software that allows users to surf the web through a network of more than 6,000 linked volunteer computers. The software automatically encrypts data in a way that ensures that no single computer in the network has all of a user's information. For surveillance experts, it becomes very difficult to trace the whereabouts of a person who visits a particular website or to attack a specific person while they are using Tor to surf the Web.


The NSA also has "major" problems with Truecrypt, a program for encrypting files on computers. Truecrypt's developers stopped their work on the program last May, prompting speculation about pressures from government agencies. A protocol called Off-the-Record (OTR) for encrypting instant messaging in an end-to-end encryption process also seems to cause the NSA major problems. Both are programs whose source code can be viewed, modified, shared and used by anyone. Experts agree it is far more difficult for intelligence agencies to manipulate open source software programs than many of the closed systems developed by companies like Apple and Microsoft. Since anyone can view free and open source software, it becomes difficult to insert secret back doors without it being noticed. Transcripts of intercepted chats using OTR encryption handed over to the intelligence agency by a partner in Prism -- an NSA program that accesses data from at least nine American internet companies such as Google, Facebook and Apple -- show that the NSA's efforts appear to have been thwarted in these cases: "No decrypt available for this OTR message." This shows that OTR at least sometimes makes communications impossible to read for the NSA.

Things become "catastrophic" for the NSA at level five - when, for example, a subject uses a combination of Tor, another anonymization service, the instant messaging system CSpace and a system for Internet telephony (voice over IP) called ZRTP. This type of combination results in a "near-total loss/lack of insight to target communications, presence," the NSA document states.
ZRTP, which is used to securely encrypt conversations and text chats on mobile phones, is used in free and open source programs like RedPhone and Signal. "It's satisfying to know that the NSA considers encrypted communication from our apps to be truly opaque," says RedPhone developer Moxie Marlinspike.

Mecanismos aparentemente inseguros:

VPN connections can be based on a number of different protocols. The most widely used ones are called Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) and Internet Protocol Security (Ipsec). Both seem to pose few problems for the NSA spies if they really want to crack a connection. Experts have considered PPTP insecure for some time now, but it is still in use in many commercial systems. (…) Ipsec as a protocol seems to create slightly more trouble for the spies. But the NSA has the resources to actively attack routers involved in the communication process to get to the keys to unlock the encryption rather than trying to break it, courtesy of the unit called Tailored Access Operations: "TAO got on the router through which banking traffic of interest flows," it says in one presentation.

Even more vulnerable than VPN systems are the supposedly secure connections ordinary Internet users must rely on all the time for Web applications like financial services, e-commerce or accessing webmail accounts. A lay user can recognize these allegedly secure connections by looking at the address bar in his or her Web browser: With these connections, the first letters of the address there are not just http -- for Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- but https. The "s" stands for "secure". The problem is that there isn't really anything secure about them. (…) The NSA and its allies routinely intercept such connections -- by the millions. According to an NSA document, the agency intended to crack 10 million intercepted https connections a day by late 2012. (…)

The NSA also has a program with which it claims it can sometimes decrypt the Secure Shell protocol (SSH). This is typically used by systems administrators to log into employees' computers remotely, largely for use in the infrastructure of businesses, core Internet routers and other similarly important systems. The NSA combines the data collected in this manner with other information to leverage access to important systems of interest.

Ciber-ataque causa danos graves a siderúrgica alemã

Este tipo de ataques ciber-físicos são há muito esperados mas continuam a ser pouco comuns, desde o famoso Stuxnet. Este caso é talvez ainda mais impressionante:

Cyberattack on German steel mill inflicts serious damage
RT.COM

Unknown hackers have inflicted ‘serious damage’ to a German steel mill this year by breaking into internal networks and accessing the main controls of the factory, the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) revealed in its annual report.

The report says that the intrusion into the mainframe system caused significant damage to a blast furnace as the attackers managed to manipulate the internal systems and industrial components, causing outages that disrupted the controlled manner of operation.

The BSI’s didn’t mention which plant was targeted nor gave any reference to the time of the attack. The Office did note the “very advanced” capabilities of the hackers.

To penetrate the security, the intruders used a “sophisticated spear phishing” method to gain access to the core networks of the plant. Using this method, which involves targeting specific individuals within an organization, the attackers first penetrated the office network of the factory. From there, they managed their way into the production networks.

(...)

notícia completa na RT.COM

Previsões para 2015

10 cybersecurity predictions for 2015
CSO online

1. Planning Goes Mainstream

2. Big Data and Security Meet at the SIEM

3. Threats Keep Evolving

4. Your Security Scope Expands

5. Passé Passwords

6. Keys Are the Key to the Cloud

7. Smartphones Get Dumb Again

8. Transnational Crime Becomes More Concerning Than Governments

9. Shhhhhh! — Securing Your Voice

10. Quit It! (Managed security)

WAP - Web Application Protection


A WAP é fruto do trabalho de doutoramento da minha aluna Ibéria Medeiros. É uma ferramenta que faz análise estática de código PHP de modo a detectar uma série de vulnerabilidades (lista mais abaixo). A detecção é feita usando uma combinação de "taint analysis" com data mining. A correcção é feita inserindo fixes no código. Um artigo que explica a abordagem e a ferramenta apareceu este ano na International Conference on World Wide Web. A ferramenta está disponível para download no sourceforge.

A ferramenta parece estar a fazer algum sucesso pois já tem mais de 1400 downloads!

Mais dados tirados da página da WAP:

WAP 2.0 is a source code static analysis and data mining tool to detect and correct input validation vulnerabilities in web applications written in PHP (version 4.0 or higher) and with a low rate of false positives. 
WAP detects and corrects the following vulnerabilities: 
  • SQL Injection (SQLI)
  • Cross-site scripting (XSS)
  • Remote File Inclusion (RFI)
  • Local File Inclusion (LFI)
  • Directory Traversal or Path Traversal (DT/PT)
  • Source Code Disclosure (SCD)
  • OS Command Injection (OSCI)
  • PHP Code Injection
This tool semantically analyses the source code. More precisely, it does taint analysis (data-flow analysis) to detect the input validation vulnerabilities. The aim of the taint analysis is to track malicious inputs inserted by entry points ($_GET, $_POST arrays) and to verify if they reaches some sensitive sink (PHP functions that can be exploited by malicious input). After the detection, the tool uses data mining to confirm if the vulnerabilities are real or false positives. At the end, the real vulnerabilities are corrected with the insertion of the fixes (small pieces of code) in the source code.
WAP is written in Java language and is constituted by three modules:

  • Code Analyzer: composed by tree generator and taint analyser. The tool has integrated a lexer and a parser generated by ANTLR, and based in a grammar and a tree grammar written to PHP language. The tree generator uses the lexer and the parser to build the AST (Abstract Sintatic Tree) to each PHP file. The taint analyzer performs the taint analysis navigating through the AST to detect potentials vulnerabilities.
  • False Positives Predictor: composed by a supervised trained data set with instances classified as being vulnerabilities and false positives and by the Logistic Regression machine learning algorithm. For each potential vulnerability detected by code analyser, this module collects the presence of the attributes that define a false positive. Then, the Logistic Regression algorithm receives them and classifies the instance as being a false positive or not (real vulnerability).
  • Code Corrector: Each real vulnerability is removed by correction of its source code. This module for the type of vulnerability selects the fix that removes the vulnerability and signalizes the places in the source code where the fix will be inserted. Then, the code is corrected with the insertion of the fixes and new files are created.